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Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
EMERALD OIL COMPANY, a corpor-
ation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 
7984 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF, 
EMERALD OIL COMPANY 
Certiorari from the State Tax Commission of the 
State of Utah 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case is before the court to review the lawfulness 
of defendant's decision which denied two claims, duly and 
regularly filed by plaintiff, for refund because of plain-
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2 
tiff's overpayment of taxes for the taxable years 1949 
and 1950, imposed by Title 80, Chapter 13, Utah Code An-· 
notated 1943, (now, and hereafter referred to as, Title 59, 
Chapter 13, Utah Code Anotated 1953), one of which 
claims is in the amount of $10,698.86, for plaintiff's over-
payment of such taxes for the taxable year 1949. The other 
claim is in the amount of $9,052.00 for plaintiff's overpay-
ment of such taxes for the taxable year of 1950. The facts 
in this case are not in dispute. 
Plaintiff was incorporated under the laws of the State 
of Utah on January 14, 1909, for the purpose of developing 
oil and gas lands located in Rio Blanco County, State of 
Colorado, which lands represented the capital with which 
it commenced business (R. 34, Ex. A). The only property 
either real or personal, owned by plaintiff since its incorpor-
ation, including the years 1949 and 1950, consisted of said 
oil and gas lands, together with the equipment thereon and j 
appurtenances thereto (R. 34; 35). 
Following plaintiff's incorporation, plaintiff performed 
the necessary work on said lands in Colorado and complied 
with the laws and regulations of the United States to ob-
tain, and it did obtain, patents covering said oil and gas 
lands in Colorado as particularly described in Exhibit ''B" 
attached to the stipulation of facts between plaintiff and 
defendant, which is part of the record in this case (R. 34). 
After its incorporation, plaintiff commenced opera-
tions on said oil lands. It hired employees and purchased 
the necessary machinery and equipment to drill for oil and 
develop said lands. It drilled wells, and constructed roads, 
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reservoirs and a warehouse on said lands. Plaintiff's opera-
tions in Colorado resulted in the discovery and production 
of oil and the sale thereof (R. 46; 47; 70). 
On May 2, 1940 and May 23, 1942, respectively, plain-
tiff entered into two agreements with Equity Oil Company 
under the terms of which the latter company was granted 
the exclusive right of possession of said lands for the pur-
pose of developing, drilling, producing, storing and market-
ing oil therefrom, subject to plaintiff's right to enter on 
said lands for the purpose of inspecting the same ·and the 
operations thereon. Plaintiff reserved the surface rights 
to said lands. Said agreements obligated Equity Oil Com-
pany and its assigns to pay royalties for oil and gas pro-
duced and marketed from said lands and, among other 
things, required certain drilling operations thereon (R. Ex-
hibits C and D; R. 79). 
Subsequent to said agreements of May 2, 1940 and May 
23, 1942, and including the years 1949 and 1950, the entire 
income of plaintiff (except a small sum representing inter-
est on government bonds) was derived from royalties paid 
to plaintiff under the terms of said agreements (R. 35). 
In order to show the continuity of the operations of 
plaintiff in Colorado, plaintiff made the following proffer 
of proof covering the activities of plaintiff during the 
period between the time of entering into said agreements 
and the years 1949 and 1950 (R. 49-51; 60) : 
"We make the proffer that this evidence would 
show that prior to the years 1949 and 1950, the of-
ficers of the Company made regular trips to the 
Rangely oil fields in the State of Colorado for the 
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purpose of inspecting its property, for the purpose 
of looking into the drilling program that was agreed 
to be conducted under its agreements with various 
oil companies to which it had leased the property, 
and including the Raven Oil Company mentioned by 1 
Mr. Vernon, and also the Equity Oil Company which 
is referred to in the agreements in question; that it 
was necessary for the company through its officers 
to employ during, a period of this time which is 
excluded, a representative in Colorado who perform-
ed activities for the Company in protecting its in-
terest to see that the drilling program was carried 
out in accordance with the agreements referred to, 
that the oil was properly measured, and other mat-
ters which might come up; that the Company during 
this period of time through its officers and directors, 
and as instructed by its stockholders in their annual 
meetings, had occasion to go to Colorado on matters 
which arose as to rights-of-way over the property, 
as to matters of trespass on the property by persons, 
and as to matters of leasing the property for grazing 
purposes ; that disputes arose in its early history as 
to certain of its unpatented mining claims and that 
it had to conduct litigation in the State of Colorado 
with respect to these claims; that it was necessary 
for the officers on occasion to meet with the officials 
in the County Treasurer's and the County Assessor's 
offices in Colorado to adjust the matter of taxes in-
volved; that it was necessary during the period of 
time which the Commission has excluded that the 
officers make investigations of its oil properties in 
Colorado to determine the number of wells that had 
been brought into production and the measurement 
devices used by the oil companies in measuring the 
Company's share of the oil." 
The evidence shows that during the years 1949 and 
1950, the officers arid directors of the company made 
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frequent trips to the company's lands in Colorado (R. 48; 
55). Mr. Andrew J. Vernon, who had been an officer and 
director of the company for many years, testified with re-
spect to the nature and purposes of these trips, as follows: 
That they were made: "Well, to inspect the 
field generally." He said, "Well, we inspected the 
field as for the location of the wells and to get them 
on a map. We had a large map; we wanted to get 
the location of these wells on our map to show where 
the drilling was being done. That was one of the 
things. And another thing, to determine if the com-
panies were drilling their quota of wells in the field ; 
to determine the producing wells and if there was 
any dry holes ; to determine how many wells were 
producing without being pumped, also to learn how 
many wells were being pumped; to determine if 
there was any wells producing water or gas ex-
cessively; to determine if there was any wells shut 
in and for what purpose, for what reason. We also 
went to the superintendent of the field (superintend-
ent of the operating company in the field) to find 
out the depth of these wells that were being drilled. 
* * * We also went to his office (said superin-
tendent's) to find the log of the well, what the strata 
was and what they were going down through, and how 
much sand bearing oil there was in these deep wells. 
We also inspected the tanks, the method of measur-
ing or gauging or metering the oil, both the shallow 
and the deep oil. We also got the number of barrels 
that were being freighted out from the field and 
compared them with the refinery that· were receiv-
ing the oil. * * * We inspected the route of the 
telephone line out there to see if it would interfere 
with the drilling in any way; also the power line, 
the pipe line that went across our ground. We also 
looked after our warehouse and material that we 
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had on the ground. * * * Also to see that the 
livestock wasn't trespassing on our ground to inter-
fere with the drilling or the operation of the oil 
companies" (R. 51-53). 
It was testified that the company employed a repre-
sentative, or agent, in Colorado, to whom it paid a salary 
for looking after the company's interests. Mr. H. Walter 
Woolley, who had been the secretary and treasurer and 
director of the company for many years, testified that said 
inspection trips to Colorado were participated in by every 
member of the Board of Directors (R: 57; 61). 
Mr. Woolley also testified : 
"If we wanted any information as to the physi-
cal well being of the field, we had to go get it. In 
other words, there was no other way of knowing 
how the field physically was being handled and oper-
ated and what the problems were without going to 
get it there" (R. 63). 
It appears from the testimony of Mr. Woolley that 
there were various other matters which required the atten-
tion of the officers of the corporation in Colorado such as 
rights of way for a pipe, telephone and electric lines, the 
investigation of possible adverse claims against said oil 
lands and tax matters (R. 65-67). 
With respect to Utah, the company held its stock· 
holders' and directors' meetings at Vernal, Utah. It main-
tained no office in Utah. Its corporate books were kept by 
its secretary and treasurer whose regular employment was 
with the Uintah State Bank (R. 55-57; 62; 63). Also, its 
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bank account was at Vernal, Utah, through which account 
it made payment of dividends (R. 73). 
After the payment of taxes and other expenses, divi-
dends were declared and paid to its stockholders out of the 
royalties received from said oil lands as authorized by the 
Board of Directors. Such activities represented substantial-
ly all of the functions of the company in the State of Utah 
(R.62;81). 
Mr. McDonald, the attorney for defendant, produced testi-
mony from Mr. Woolley to the effect that the two agree-
ments between the company and Equity Oil Company were 
authorized by the Board of Directors at a meeting held at 
Vernal, Utah (R. 77-79). The testimony discloses that the 
preliminary investigations and negotiations which resulted 
in the execution of said agreements were carried on in the 
State of Colorado (R. 81). 
The record also shows that the company paid its fran-
chise tax for authority to do business as a foreign corpora-
tion in Colorado, ad valorem taxes on its real property in 
said state and substantial taxes based and measured on the 
company's share in the production of oil from said lands. 
It appears that the latter taxes were levied and assessed 
by the State of Colorado on the basis of net income derived 
from property located and business transacted within said 
state. The company paid to the State of Colorado on Febru-
ary 23, 1951, and December 23, 1951, taxes in the sum of 
$52,440.59 for the years 1945 to 1951 inclusive; and also 
paid to Rio Blanco County, State of Colorado taxes in the 
amount of $23,669.97 (R. 35; 79-81). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT'S DECISION DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR REFUND IS CON-
TRARY TO SECTION 59-13-20 (1) UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, BECAUSE IT ALLOCATES 
TO UTAH, INCOME DERIVED FROM BUSI-
NESS DONE OUTSIDE THIS STATE. 
(a) The taxes for which plaintiff claims a re-
fund were computed and paid by plaintiff on in-
come which was all derived from business done by 
plaintiff in the State of Colorado. 
(b) The case of J. M. and M. S. Browning Co. 
v. State Tax Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 
2d 993, upon which defendant relies in allocating 
said income to Utah and denying plaintiff's claims, 
is distinguishable because plaintiff was not carry-
ing on an "investment business." 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S DECISION DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S CLAIMS FOR REFUND BECAUSE OF 
ITS OVERPAYMENT OF TAXES DURING 
THE TAXABLE YEARS 1949 AND 1950, IS 
CONTRARY TO TITLE 5.9, CHAPTER 13, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS IN 
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UTAH DURING SAID TAXABLE YEARS 
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SAID STATUTE. 
(a) The proper basis and measure of plaintiff's 
tax liability was net income, if any, derived 
from business done in Utah. 
(b) The corporate acts of plaintiff in Utah, 
during the taxable years 1949 and 1950, did not 
constitute "doing business" witl~in the meaning of 
that term as used by the Utah act. 
ARGUMENT-
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT'S DECISION DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR REFUND IS CON-
TRARY TO SECTION 59-13-20 (1) UTAH'CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953, BECAUSE IT ALLOCATES 
TO UTAH, INCOME DERIVED FROM BUSI-
NESS DONE OUTSIDE THIS STATE. 
Section 59-13-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which 
sets forth rules for determining net income to be allocated 
to Utah, provides: "(1) Rents, interest and dividends de-
rived from business done outside this state less related ex-
penses shall not be allocated to this state." 
(a) The taxes for which plaintiff claims a re-
fund were computed and paid by plaintiff on in-
come which was all derived from business done by 
plaintiff in the State of Colorado. 
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The authorities hereinbelow cited under POINT NO. 2 
hold that the corporate acts of the defendant in Utah did 
not constitute "doing business" within the purview of sta-
tutes imposing a franchise tax. Irrespective of whether 
plaintiff was doing business in Utah within the meaning 
of that term as used in the Utah act, the record in this 
I 
case discloses that the entire income yielded from plain-
tiff's oil lands located in Colorado, was solely and directly 
attributable to plaintiff's activities in Colorado. Whatever 
gainful pursuit was carried on by plaintiff since, and pur-
suant to the purpose of, its incorporation, was carried on in 
Colorado. The Utah act and the decisions of this state con-
struing the same, clearly indicate that the basis and 
measure of said tax is the business done by the taxpaying 
corporation which is productive of income. J. M. and M.S. 
Browning Co. v. State Tax Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154 
P. 2d 993; California Packing Corporation v. State Tax 
Commission, 97 Utah 367, 93 P. 2d 463. 
The term "doing business" has been variously defined 
by the courts. As Justice Wolfe points out in the Brou·niug 
case: 
"The definitions differ widely depending upon 
the context in connection with which the term is 
found * * * Little can be gained from a de-
tailed study of the cases discussing the term 'doing 
business' with a different context." 
I 
It is clear, however, from the record in this case, that 
plaintiff was engaged in business in the State of Colorado 
in the sense which that term is used in the Utah statute. 
Royalties are in some respects different from rents as the. 
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term rent is ordinarily understood. Royalties represent a 
· landowner's share of oil, gas or other minerals which are 
: produced and sold from his land. The royalties which plain-
~ tiff's Colorado properties yielded in the years 1949 and 
: 1950 are not attributable to any specific activities of plain-
tiff within any designated period of time. The royalties 
~which plaintiff received during said years were the fruit 
: of the continuity of plaintiff's activities in Colorado. 
Colorado not only imposed a franchise tax against 
plaintiff for the privilege of its doing business in that state 
and an ad valorem tax against plaintiff's oil lands, but 
. Colorado also levied a substantial tax against plaintiff based 
on and measured by the net income derived from plaintiff's 
.. property located and business transacted within Colorado 
during the taxable years in question. If plaintiff is held 
to be liable also for taxes as found and determined under 
the decision of defendant, which is before this court for 
:review, plaintiff then will have been subjected to double 
taxation which the legislature clearly has indicated should 
be avoided. 
(b) The case of J. M. and M. S. Browning Co. 
v. State Tax Commission, 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 
2d 993, upon which defendant relies in allocating 
said income to Utah and denying plaintiff's claims, 
is distinguishable because plaintiff was not carry-
ing on an "investment business." 
The Browning case held that the income of the tax-
ipaying corporation was derived from carrying on an "invest-
ment business" solely in Utah and that it was such business 
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done by the taxpaying corporation which was the basis and 
measure of the tax. The Browning case places the emphasis 
on business done by the taxpaying corporation rather than 
upon business done by companies in which the taxpaying 
corporation holds investments. To this extent, the Brown-
ing case overrules American Investment Corporation v. , 
I 
State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 189, 120 P. 2d 331. It is 
clear that plaintiff was never engaged in an "investment 1 
business" within the sense of the Browning case. Justice · 
Wolfe, speaking for the court in the Browning case, says: 
"J. M. & M.S. Browning Company, among other 
things not material to the issues of this case, en-
. gaged in the business of investing and reinvesting 
its funds in domestic and foreign stocks and bonds 
and holding the same for investment." 
"The 'business done' in carrying on an invest-
ment business is to invest money in stocks, bonds, 
properties, first mortgages, and to make loans, etc., 
and to collect the fruits of such investments by col-
lecting rents, interest and dividends." 
In American Investment Corporation v. State Tax Com-
mission (supra), which was overruled by the Browning 
case, Justice Wolfe, in his dissenting opinion, states: 
"The statute we here construe concerns, I re-
peat, the franchise of an 'investment' company. Its 
business consists of transactions in the making of 
investments in other corporations and enterprises. 
Its profits or losses result from doing such business." ' 
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POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S DECISION DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S CLAIMS FOR REFUND BECAUSE OF 
ITS OVERPAYMENT OF TAXES DURING 
THE TAXABLE YEARS 1949 AND 1950, IS 
CONTRARY TO TITLE 59, CHAPTER 13, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS IN 
UTAH DURING SAID TAXABLE YEARS 
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SAID STATUTE. 
If, contrary to the findings of the defendant, plaintiff 
was not doing business within the State of Utah during the 
taxable years in question, within the sense of said statute, 
the net income -yielded from royalties on plaintiff's Colorado 
oil lands was not the proper basis and measure of the tax 
imposed by the Utah Franchise Tax Act. 
(a) The proper basis and measure of plaintiff's 
tax liability was net income, if any,. derived 
from business done in Utah. 
The basis and measure of the tax imposed by the Utah 
statute is income derived from business done by the tax-
paying corporation within the State of Utah, or the fair 
value of its tangible property in this state, whichever re-
sults in the greater tax; "but in no case shall the tax be 
less than $10.00." Section 59-13-3, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. Plaintiff never owned any tangible property in the 
State of Utah. The basis and measure of plaintiff's tax 
liability, therefore, was its net income assignable to busi-
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ness done within the State of Utah, with a minimum tax 
liability of $10.00. 
That the tax imposed against corporations by the Utah 
act, with the exceptions above noted, is based upon and 
measured by income derived from engaging in or carrying 
on business within Utah, has been clearly stated by the 
legislature and this court. The first paragraph of Section 
59-13-20 of Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides: I 
"The portion of net income assignable to busi-
ness done within this state, and which shall be the 
basis and measure of the tax imposed by this chap-
ter, may be determined by an allocation upon the 
basis of the following rules:" (Emphasis ours). 
The Browning case affirms this interpretation of the 
statute as follows : 
"The tax is not an income tax. * * * The 
tax is imposed on the privilege of exercising the 
corporate franchise or on the privilege of doing 
business in Utah." 
"By using the net income of the taxpayer, al-
located to Utah as the measure of the amount of the 
tax imposed upon the privilege of doing business in 
Utah, the statute ties the amount of the ta.r to the 
income yielded from exercising the privilege of doiug 
business or exercising the corporate franchise" 
(Emphasis ours). 
In California Packing Corporation v. State TaJ.· Com· 
mission, (supra) this court said: 
"The tax established in the act is 'in the nature 
of an excise tax levied against domestic and foreign 
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corporations alike for the privilege of doing business 
in a corporate capacity within this state.' Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 94 Conn. 47, 
1008 A. 154, 157; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State 
Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82, 69 L. 
Ed. 282 ; Stanley Works v. Hackett, 122 Conn. 54 7, 
190 A. 743. The language of the statute throughout 
evidences an intent only to determine the franchise 
tax from income from business done under the 
franchise from the state, that is business done with-
in the state. The various methods of allocation are 
designed to restrict the tax to business done within 
the state and to assign to the state for taxation that 
portion of the business reasonably attributable to the 
state. There is also apparent -a purpose to avoid 
double taxation. The statute itself provides: 
"'* * * (1) Rents, interest and dividends 
derived from business done outside this state less re-
lated expenses shall not be allocated to this state. 
* * *' 
"' (3) Rents, interest and dividends derived 
from business done in this state less related expenses 
shall be allocated to this state'." 
The initial question, therefore, with respect to plain-
tiff's tax liability, except as to the minimuin tax of $10.00, 
is whether, during the taxable years 1949 and 1950, plain-
tiff was doing business within the State of Utah within the 
purview of the statute. The net income to be allocated to 
this state in accordance with the rules set forth in Section 
59-13~20 of said code, is income attributable to business 
done within this state; and rule (8) of said section author-
izes the Tax Commission to make such allocation so as to 
avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation. 
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(b) The corporate acts of plaintiff in Utah, 
during the taxable years 1949 and 1950, did not 
constitute "doing business" within the meaning of 
that term as used by the Utah act. 
The corporate action of plaintiff in Utah during the 
years 1949 and 1950 was confined to the management of its 
internal affairs. Plaintiff hired no employees, rented no 
office and maintained no organization in Utah to carry on 
business for profit and gain. Numerous authorities hold 
that under the circumstances disclosed by the record in 
this case, a corporation is not doing business within the 
purview of statutes such as the Utah act. 51 Am. Jur. P. 
714, Sec. 796; 124 A. L. R. 1110. 
Such meaning of the term "doing business" as used 
in acts imposing a franchise tax has been recognized by 
this court. J. M. and M.S. Browning Company v. State T~ 
Commission (supra) ; American Inv. Corporation v. State 
Tax Commission (supra) ; California Packing Corporation 
v. State Tax Commission (supra). And such interpretation 
of the term "doing business" has been applied in the follow· 
ing cases, some of which are cited and relied upon in said 
Utah decisions. Cottonwood Coal Company v. Junod, 7~ 
Mont. 3.92, 236 P. 1080; Norman v. Southwestern R. Com. 
pany, 42 Ga. App. 812, 157 S. E. 531; United States v 
Emery Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28, 35 S. Ct. 499 
59 L. Ed. 825; People ex rel. Manila Electric R. and Light· 
ing Corporation v. Knapp, 229 N. Y. 502, 128 N. E. 892 
894; State v. Anniston Rolling Mills, 125 Ala. 121, 27 So 
921; People v. Pestner, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1017; McCoach V 
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Mine Hill Railway Company, 228 U. S. 295; Flint v. Tracy 
Company, 220 U. S. 107. 
In Cottonwood Coal Company v. Junod, (supra) the 
taxpaying corporation was organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Minnesota with its principal place 
of business in the City of St. Paul, for the general business 
of mining coal or other minerals and doing whatever was 
necessary or proper in connection therewith, and was duly 
qualified to do business in the State of Montana. The Min-
nesota corporation was engaged in business of mining coal 
within the State of Montana where its plants and mines 
were located. The question before the court, upon demurrer, 
was whether, under the following facts, the corporation ·was 
also doing business in the state of its domicile within the 
sense of the Montana statute: 
"That a majority of the directors and officers 
of the plaintiff corporation at all of the times herein 
mentioned were, and now are, residing in the state 
of Minnesota ; that all of the meetings of the stock-
holders, and of the board of directors, of the plain-
tiff corporation, have been held in the state of Min-
nesota; that at all of the times herein mentioned, 
and now, the plaintiff corporation uses an office 
in the city of St. Paul, Minn., equipped with desks 
and furniture, all of which is owned by the Great 
Northern Railway Company; that at all of the times 
herein mentioned some of the business plans and 
policies of the plaintiff corporation have been form-
ulated at its principal office in St. Paul, Minn., and 
that the business of the plaintiff corporation carried 
on by it in the state of Montana is, and at all times 
herein mentioned has been, partially supervised ~nd 
directed through its main office in St. Paul, Minn.; 
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that some of the financial affairs of the plaintiff 
corporation at all of the times herein mentioned 
were handled and managed by the plaintiff corpora. 
tion at its head office in St. Paul, Minn., and some 
of the proceeds derived from the business of the 
plaintiff corporation in the state of Montana dur-
ing the times herein mentioned were sent to the main 
office of the plaintiff company at St. Paul, Minn., 
and deposited in certain banks in St. Paul, Minn., to 
the credit of the plaintiff company, from which dis-
bursements were made from time to time for the 
expenses in operating its business in the state of 
Montana; that during the year 1920 plaintiff re-
ceived in the city of St. Paul, Minn., interest on 
Liberty bonds and bank balances owned by it in 
banks in the city of St. Paul, Minn., amounting to 
$2,596.06, no part of which was returned by the 
plaintiff as income of the plaintiff in computing 
the license tax in question, and that the defendant 
above named, by reason of the foregoing facts, ad-
judged that plaintiff was a corporation doing busi-
ness partly outside of the state of Montana, and 
that it was therefore not entitled to the deductions 
specified in section 3 (2 ?) of said act." 
The Supreme Court of Montana held that the activities 
of the taxpaying corporation in Minnesota, hereinabove set 
forth, did not constitute engaging in business within the 
sense of the Montana Statute. The court said: 
"From this it appears that, when the statute 
uses the expression 'engaged in business,' whether 
in this state or elsewhere, it is speaking in terms of 
profit and loss, and does not refer to mere corporate 
action, such as holding meetings of the board of 
directors, doing clerical work of bookkeeping, form-
ulating the plans and policies, or performing other 
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corporate acts, which do not in and of themselves 
result in the production of income, but does con-
template some kind of business the conduct of which 
results in an income-some gainful occupation of the 
corporation. This purpose and intent is manifest 
all through the various provisions of the statute." 
"Necessarily a corporation must do certain acts 
with reference to its corporate activity at the state 
in which it is incorporated. Usually it must main-
tain an office, keep certain records, and hold annual 
meetings of its stockholders therein. Doing these 
things implies that it is carrying on business to 
some extent in such state, but by doing them it is 
not 'engaged in business' there, within the purview 
of the statute, which uses the word 'business' solely 
in connection with its gainful pursuit, and as a 
means of determining its net income as the basis of 
fixing a license fee. In the statute under considera-
tion the activity of the corporation is not made the 
measure of the license fee, except as such activity 
manifests itself in the production of income." 
The foregoing decision of the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana is cited and approved by said court in State v. J. C. 
Maguire Const. Co., 113 Mont. 324, 125 P. 2d 433, which 
holds that the Montana Statute, construed in the Junod 
case, imposes a franchise tax upon the privilege of doing 
business in Montana in a corporate capacity. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
CONCLUSION 
The record, which is before this court for review, dis-
closes that the defendant's decision denying plaintiff's 
claims for refund is contrary to law because the taxes for 
which plaintiff claims a refund, were paid by plaintiff on 
income which was all derived from business done by plain-
tiff in the State of Colorado. Said record also discloses~ 
that defendant's decision, denying plaintiff's claims for re- · 
fund for taxes paid by plaintiff for the taxable years 1949 
and 1950, is contrary to law because plaintiff was not 
doing business in Utah during said taxable years within 
the purview of Title 59, Chapter 13, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. Plaintiff prays this Honorable Court, therefore, that 
plaintiff's claims for refund be allowed, with interest. 
April 17, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. E. HENDERSON, of 
RAY, RAWLINS, 
JONES & HENDERSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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